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Abstract. Non-balanced TU -games, which are games with empty core,
can also be characterized by the existence of certain type of cycles of
pre-imputations. A particular sub-class of these cycles is that of maximal
U -cycles. They show up in connection with the application of a transfer
scheme to games with empty core, although this transfer scheme was
originally designed however, to reach a point in the core of a balanced
TU -game. While the appearance of one of such cycles is enough to detect
the non-balancedness of the game, it is still an open question if every non-
balanced game has a maximal U -cycle. The aim of this note is to show,
however, that there are always, in non-balanced games, approximated
maximal U -cycles sharing with the true maximal U -cycles all their good
properties.
1 Introduction
The core of a game is one of the most widely used concept of solution in coopera-
tive game theory. Bondareva ([1]) and Shapley ([5]) characterize those game with
transferable utility ( TU -game) having non-empty core as the class of balanced
games. The key concept here is that of balanced family of coalitions (Section 2).
More recently, Cesco ([2],[4]) gave two more characterization of balanced games,
although in this case, the key notion to prove the results is that of cycle of
pre-imputations. The results state that a TU -game has empty core if and only if
certain type of cycles, fundamental cycles in the first reference, U -cycles (Section
2) in the second one, are present in the game.
A U -cycle is a particular version of a fundamental cycle and appears in con-
nection with a transfer scheme introduced by [2] to reach a point in the core
of a balanced TU -game. A transfer scheme is a bargaining dynamic processes,
consistent with the standards of rational behavior, leading from an unacceptable
payoff to an acceptable one. The sequences generated by the transfer scheme de-
veloped in [2] are called maximal U -sequences, and it is proven there that they
always converge to an imputation in the core of a TU -game with empty core.
On the other hand, a numerical algorithm to generate maximal U -sequences has
been developed. When it was used in the framework of non-balanced games,
the maximal U -sequences generated by the algorithm have not converged at
all as was expected. However, all the numerical examples worked out in this
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sub-class of games have revealed the numerical appearance of limit cycles of
pre-imputations, in the sense of dynamical systems. This behavior suggests that
maximal U -sequences should ”converge” to such limit cycles. That numerical ob-
served pattern is plausible since, as we will show below, the set of pre-imputations
in a maximal U -sequence is always a bounded set. Nevertheless, no general con-
vergence theoretic result has been proven yet, even though the boundedness of
maximal U -sequences justify the appearance of approximate maximal U -cycles
instead. The aim of this note is to present some results showing that these ap-
proximated cycles, which are numerically accessible, are able to provide the same
kind of information that true cycles provide. For instance, we will prove that a
family of coalitions, naturally related to them, is balanced, like in the case of
maximal U -cycles. We will also prove that non-balanced games can be character-
ized by the appearance of approximated cycles, paralleling thus, the main results
proven by [3] and [4]. We also present in this note a result indicating how good
the approximation has to be in order for an approximated maximal U -cycle give
the same information as a maximal true U -cycles provide.
2 Preliminaries
A TU -game is an ordered pair (N, v), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite non-
empty set, the set of players, v is the characteristic function, which is a real
valued function defined on the family of subsets of N,P(N) satisfying v(φ) =
0. The elements in P(N) are called coalitions. The set of pre-imputations is
E = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)}, and the set of imputations
is A = {x ∈ E : xi ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N}.Given a pre-imputation x and a
coalition S in a game (N, v), the excess of the coalition S with respect to x is
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S), where x(S) = ∑i∈S xi if S 6=φ and 0 otherwise. The core
of (N, v) is the set C = {x ∈ E : e(S, x) ≤ 0 for all S ∈ P(N)}.
The core of a game may be the empty set. The Shapley-Bondareva theorem
([1], [5]) characterizes the sub-class of TU -games with non-empty core, where
the notion of balanced subfamily of coalitions plays a central role. A non-empty
family B is balanced if and only if there exists a set of positive real numbers
(λS)S∈B, the balancing weights, such that
∑
S∈B(i)
λS = 1 for all i ∈ N . Here B(i) =
{S ∈ B : i ∈ S} . A game (N, v) is balanced if w(B, v) = ∑S∈B λSv(S) ≤ v(N)
for all balanced family B with balancing weights (λS). Shapley- Bondareva’s
theorem states that the core of a TU−game is non-empty if and only if the
game is balanced.
A minimal balanced family is one that includes no other proper balanced
subfamily, and it has a unique set of balancing weights ([5]).
Balancedness can also be defined as follows. Let χS ∈ Rn denotes the vector
defined by (χS)i = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise (the indicator vector of S). Then,
a family B is balanced if there exist positive balancing weights (λS)S∈B such
that
∑
S∈B λSχS = χN . For each non-empty, proper coalition S ∈ P(N), let us
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define
βS =
1
|S|χS −
1
|N\S|χN\S .
Given a non-empty family B of proper coalitions of N, BB will stand for the
matrix having as its columns the vectors βS , S ∈ B. Then the following charac-
terization for balanced families of coalitions holds ([3], Theorem 6).
Theorem 1. A family B of non-empty proper coalitions of N is balanced if and
only if the linear system
BB.y = 0 (1)
has a solution y = (yS)S∈B with yS > 0 for all S ∈ B (positive solution).
A transfer sequence in a game (N, v) is a sequence of pre-imputations (xk), k ≥
1, such that there exist associated sequences of positive real numbers (µk), k ≥ 1
and (Sk), k ≥ 1 of non-empty, proper coalitions of N (not necessarily all differ-
ent) satisfying the neighboring transfer properties
xk+1 = xk + µk.βSkforallk ≥ 1.
A cycle c is a finite transfer sequence (xk)m+1k=1 ,m ≥ 1, such that
xm+1 = x1, (2)
and
µm+1 = µ1, Sm+1 = S1,
as well.
A cycle is fundamental if µk ≤ e(Sk, xk) for all k = 1, ...,m.
A cycle is a U -cycle if µk = e(Sk, x
k) for all k = 1, ...,m.
A U -cycle is maximal if for all k = 1, ...,m, e(Sk, x
k) ≥ e(S, xk) for all coalition
S. Given a cycle c = (xk)mk=1, we denote the vector of coalitions (Sk)
m
k=1 by
supp(c) and the entries of the vector (µk)
m
k=1 will be referred to as the transfer
amounts. Let B (c) = {S : S = Sk for some entry of supp(c)}. We will refer to
B (c) as the family of coalitions supporting c, and unlike supp(c), all its members
are different. Given a fundamental cycle c, the coalitions in supp(c) and B (c)
are both balanced families ([3], Theorem 1).
The existence of cycles in a TU -game is strongly related to the non-existence
of points in the core of the game. The following characterization result is derived
from the main results by Cesco ([3],[4]).
Theorem 2. Let (N, v) be a TU -game. Then, the following statements are
equivalent.
a) The core of (N, v) is empty.
b) There exists a fundamental cycle in (N, v).
c) There exists a U -cycle in (N, v).
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The key to prove that b) implies a) is a good representation for the worth
w(B, v) of supp(c) with respect to a very specific set of balancing weights deter-
mined in terms of information gathered from the cycle.
If in (2) above we replace the equality between xm+1 and x1 by
xm+1 − x1 = bε
with ‖bε‖2 ≤ ε, (whatever µm+1 and Sm+1 could be), we will have an ε-cycle.
Similarly to cycles, we will also speak about fundamental, U and maximal U
ε-cycles.
3 Results
It would be interesting to be able to add the claim ”d) There exists a maximal
U -cycle in (N, v)” to Theorem 2 above. Clearly the existence of a maximal U -
cycle implies the emptiness of the core of the game, since the maximal U -transfer
scheme starting at any pre-imputation of the cycle would never converge, as it
should be, if the core were non-empty ([2]). However, we have not been capable
yet to prove that, whenever a game has empty core, there is a maximal U -cycle,
and we can only report partial results. Besides the existence problem, there is
another important issue to be dealt with, namely, if there exists a computational
device to generate such kind of cycles. Some computational experience based on
an algorithm implementing the transfer scheme introduced by [2], when applied
to games with non-empty core, shows that the sequences generated by the al-
gorithm (maximal U -sequences) have always limit cycles of pre-imputations (in
the sense of dynamical systems) which are, in fact, numerical maximal U -cycles
(maximal U -cycles within the machine tolerance). We do not have a formal
proof yet that every maximal U -sequence has a ”true” maximal U -cycle as a
limit cycle. However, the next result justifies this observed behavior. It states
that maximal U -sequences are bounded.
Theorem 3. Let (N, v) be a TU -game. Then, every maximal U -sequence in
(N, v) is bounded. Moreover, any maximal transfer sequence starting at a pre-
imputation x1 will be bounded (in the 2-norm) by max
{∥∥x1∥∥
2
,
√
K1 +K2
}
,
where K1 and K2 are positive constants independent of x
1.
We will refer to the associated family of coalitions B = (Sk)mk=1 as the sup-
porting family of the ε-cycle. If certain conditions prevail, this family is balanced
as it is shown in the next result.
Theorem 4. Let (N, v) be a TU -game and let (xk)m+1k=1 be a ε-cycle of pre-
imputations such that e(Sk, x
k) ≥ δ for all k = 1, ...,m for some positive δ.
Then, if ε ≤ 12K(n)δ, the supporting family B = (Sk)mk=1 is balanced.
To prove this theorem, the following auxiliary result plays a key role.
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Lemma 1. Let B a family of m different proper coalitions of N. Let us assume
that there exists a positive solution yε for the linear system
BB.yε = bε
with 0 < ‖bε‖2 ≤ ε, ε > 0. Then there is a solution xˆ of the homogeneous system
BB.x = 0 such that ‖xˆ− yε‖ ≤ K(n).ε where K(n) is a constant depending on
n solely.
Note 1. The constant K(n) is related somehow with the condition number of the
BB matrices. On the other hand, the positive number δ can be chosen depending
on the game (N, v) solely.
The next two propositions will characterize games with empty core in terms
of maximal ε-cycles.
Proposition 1. Let (N, v) be a TU -game and c =(xk)m+1k=1 an ε-cycle of pre-
imputations with e(Sk, x
k) ≥ δ > 0 for all coalition Sk belonging to its associated
supporting family of coalitions B = (Sk)mk=1, for some ε ≤ 14n3K(n)δ. Then the
game is non-balanced.
Of course, the ε-cycles in the above result can be maximal ε-cycles. In this case,
a converse of Proposition 1 also holds.
Proposition 2. Let (N, v) be a non-balanced game. Then there exist δ > 0,
0 < ε ≤ 14n3K(n)δ and a maximal ε-cycle (xk)m+1k=1 of pre-imputations with
e(Sk, x
k) ≥ δ for each coalition Sk belonging to its supporting family of coalitions
B = (Sk)mk=1.
Theorem 5. Let (N, v) be a game. Then, it is non-balanced if and only if there
exists a maximal ε-cycle (xk)m+1k=1 satisfying e(Sk, x
k) ≥ δ for some δ > 0 and
for each coalition Sk belonging to its supporting family of coalitions B = (Sk)mk=1
while 0 < ε ≤ 14n3K(n)δ.
4 Conclusions
In this note we develop an approximate theory to maximal U -cycles. We have
available an algorithm to get an approximate cycle whose extreme points (ini-
tial and final points) are as close as we wish. Moreover, if the distance between
this extreme points is less or equal than a constant depending of the number
of players and a bound for the excesses related to the imputations in the ap-
proximate cycle, then we can assure that its supporting family of coalitions is
balanced, and moreover, that the game is non balanced. Thus, we have a prac-
tical numerical device to get approximate maximal U -cycles capable to provide
the same information that true maximal U -cycles do. It is worth noting that in
all the examples worked out, the supporting family of the cycles obtained by the
algorithm has been a minimal balanced family.
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